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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GIBBONS AND REED COMPANY, a ) 
Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, CASE NO. 14030 
vs. 
CITY OF OGDEN, UTAH, a municipal 
corporation; UTAH STATE ROAD COM- ) 
MISSION; OSCAR A. ROBIN; and HARDY 
SCALES CO., a corporation, ) 
Defendants and Respondents. ) 
APPELLANT'S BRIEP 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by highway contractor against a 
landowner and its successors in interest for breach of an 
agreement to supply road building materials; against the 
Utah State Road Commission for breach of a highway con-
struction contract; and against the landowner's successors 
for interference. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The trial court entered judgment in favor of all defen-
dants and respondents, no cause of action. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff and appellant seeks reversal of the judgment 
and remand to the district court with directions to enter 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Judgment for appellant in the amount of $41,596.00; or to 
make additional findings of fact; or for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In connection with its highway construction program, it 
is the custom of the Utah State Road Commission to obtain 
options to purchase road building materials, and to permit 
its highway contractors to exercise the options in order to 
obtain necessary materials. "When bids are solicited, the 
options are included in the proposed contract. 
In early 1965, the Road Commission was planning a sec-
tion of Interstate 15 between 31st Street and 300 North in 
Ogden. Two representatives of the commission, Richard N. 
Griffin and Otto Schrader, Jr., approached C. Ray Kimball, 
Assistant Ogden City Engineer, about the possibility of 
purchasing road building materials from the city. They were 
referred by Mr. Kimball to Charles R. Kelly, Director of 
Public Works (R.555). 
Mr. Kelly said he believed that some materials could be 
removed, and the price of $.03 per cubic yard was discussed, 
but Mr. Kelly asked the road commission representatives to 
send him a letter requesting the option (R.556). 
On May 20, 1965, Mr. Schrader wrote a letter to Mr. 
Kelly (Ex.F), stating that the Road Commission's needed 
approximately 1,900,000 cubic yards of material, and that it 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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4." Special Stipulations. This option is 
for the purpose of establishing the price at which 
satisfactory granular or other materials will be 
available to the Road Commission for use as bor-
row or other road building purposes. It shall al-
so cover special conditions affecting their avail-
ability and removal. It shall not be construed to 
mean that the Road Commission shall have a sole or 
prior right to all materials on the above-described 
property for the entire duration of the option. 
The Owner or its authorized representative will be 
contacted and essential arrangements made for each, 
or any, occupancy and removal of materials. All 
stipulations regarding work areas, conditions in 
which property shall be left and any other perti-
nent agreements shall be made before entry is made 
upon the property for the purpose of removing any 
road building material. 
The removal of any material coming within the 
scope of this option must positively be removed to 
the Owner's lines and grades. 
5. This option shall be binding on the 
parties hereto, their successors, heirs and as- 1 
signs. 1 
6. This option expires December 31, 1966. 1 
(R.353-354) . | 
There are some variations in the testimony regarding 
the negotiations. Mr. Griffin testified that Mr. Kelly 
pointed out that there was an option to Marquardt until 
about April 1, 1966, and that he would like the materials 
removed to an average depth of 6 feet (R.556). Mr. Griffin 
told Mr. Kelly about the plan of the Road Commission to 
include the option in its construction contract (R.559), and 
to make material available to its contractor under an estab-
lished price for the material (R.560). The provision with 
respect to removal to the "Owner's lines and grades" was 
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property, and on the basis of the lines and grades specified 
by Mr. Kimball, determined that 628,000 cubic yards would be 
available from the property (R.628). A later survey by 
Donald Hargis, led to a determination that 1,048,713.5 cubic 
yards was available (R.699). 
The Gibbons and Reed computations were consistent with 
the plans in the construction contract with the Road Commis-
sion, which contemplated the removal of 1,937,655 cubic 
yards from "Prospect No. 1," which included the city and 
railroad property (R.628). Of this sum, 1,274,000 cubic 
yards was to come from the railroad property (R.629), leaving 
663,655 cubic yards to come from the city property. 
Gibbons and Reed Company computed its highway bid on the 
assumption that substantially all of the fill material would 
be obtainable from Prospect No. 1. 
Gibbons and Reed was low bidder and on February 18, 
1966, entered into a construction contract with the Road 
Commission (Ex.G). 
The standard specifications incorporated in the con-
struction contract (Ex.M) contained the following provisions 
with respect to options for the purchase of road building 
material: 
The commission may acquire or secure options 
and make available to the contractor the right 
to take materials from these sources designa-
ted on the plans and described under special 
provisions, together with the right to use such 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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bargaining. It was well known to Ogden City that the 
Road Commission needed approximately 2,000,000 cubic yards 
of fill material, and that the benefit of the option would 
be assigned to the highway contractor who was a successful 
bidder on the 1-15 section. It was known (and it is common 
knowledge) that highway contractors in preparing their bids 
must know not only the price of material they are going to 
use in the contract, but the quantities they can obtain at 
a given price. The court chose to construe the option 
agreement as if it meant nothing. 
If possible, a court should construe an agreement to 
give it some effect. The general rule is well stated in 17 
Am.Jur.2d, Contracts, §254: 
* * * The terms of a contract must, if 
possible, be construed to mean something, 
rather than nothing at all, and where it is 
possible to do so by a construction in ac-
cordance with the fair intendment of a con-
tract, the tendency of the courts is to 
give it life, virility, and effect, rather 
than to nullify or destroy it. 
In Schofield v. ZCMI, 85 Utah 281, 39 P.2d 342 (1934), 
an employee of ZCMI had sought to enforce rights under a 
pension program. ZCMI argued that the pension plan was an 
offer of a gratuity and was not meant to constitute a bind-
ing contract between the parties. In rejecting this argu-
ment, this court said: 
It is elemental, in construing a contract, 
that its purpose, its nature, and subject mat-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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ter should be considered. A construction giv-
ing an instrument a legal effect to accomplish 
its purpose will be adopted when it can reason-
ably be done, and between two possible construe-
' tions that will be adopted which establishes a 
valid contract. [Citations omitted]. 
These statements are in accord with the general rule as 
found in Restatement of Contracts, §236. 
The purpose of the parties in this case was to assure 
a source of material for the construction of a highway. 
It was known by all that a substantial amount of material 
was required and that the contractor, in making his bid, 
would base his base prices upon the quantities of material 
available at particular prices and from particular sources. 
The contract is phrased in terms of legal liabilities: 
The Owner agrees to sell to the Road 
Commission, road building material * * *. 
If and when this option is exercised 
the Road Commission agrees to pay, or cause 
to be paid, for said road building materials 
at the rate of $0.03 (THREE CENTS) per cubic 
yard. 
he Road Comiuxo^^,— 
This option is for the purpose of es-
tablishing the price at which satisfactory 
granular or other materials will be avail-
able to the Road Commission for use as bor-
row or other road building purposes. (Empha-
sis added.) 
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Inasmuch as the parties intended to create legally 
enforceable rights, the only remaining substantial question 
of contract construction is whether the contract was too 
uncertain to be enforceable, because of the fact that it did 
not specify the quantity of material to be made available. 
The option agreement provided that the material would 
be removed to the Owner's "lines and grades,ff but all of the 
witnesses agreed that such a provision would not permit the 
Owner to specify such lines and grades that no material 
could be removed. All knew that the highway contractor was 
entitled to remove some material. But how much? 
The option agreement is analogous, in many respects to 
a "satisfaction" contract, i.e., one in which performance is 
conditional upon satisfaction of the promisor, and a rule 
like that applied in satisfaction contracts should be ap-
plied in this case. 
The rule is set out in Restatement of Contracts, §265, 
as follows: 
A promise in terms conditional on the 
promisor's satisfaction with an agreed ex-
change, gives rise to no duty of immediate 
performance until such satisfaction; but 
where it is doubtful whether words mean that 
a promise is conditional on the promisor's 
personal satisfaction with an agreed exchange, 
or on the sufficiency of that exchange to sat-
isfy a reasonable man in the promisor's posi-
tion, the latter interpretation is adopted. 
-13-
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In Haymore v. Levinson, 8 Utah 2d 66, 328 P.2d 307 
(1953) , involving a house that was to be paid for upon 
"satisfactory completion," this court rejected the notion 
that the promisor was not required to pay unless "satis-
fied." The court distinguised "personal" satisfaction con-
tracts from others, and said: 
The other class of cases involve satis-
faction as to such things as operative fit-
ness, mechanical utility or structural com-
pletion in which the personal sensibilities 
just mentioned would not reasonably be deemed 
of such predominant importance to the perfor-
mance. As to such contracts the better con-
sidered view, and the one we adhere to, is 
that an objective standard should be applied; 
that is, the party favored by such a provi-
sion has no arbitrary privilege of declining 
to acknowledge satisfaction and that he can-
not withhold approval unless there is apparent 
some reasonable justification for doing so. 
Applying the objective standard, the court held that if, 
in light of such a standard, construction would meet the 
approval of reasonable and prudent persons, that should be 
sufficient. And in 13th and Washington Streets Corp. v. 
Neslen, 123 Utah 70, 254 P.2d 847 (1953), the court applied 
an objective standard notwithstanding a contract provision 
that the landlord would be "the sole judge" of the amount of 
heat, light, janitor and elevator services to be furnished 
for a building. 
See also Mattei v. Hopper, 51 Cal.2d 119, 330 P,2d 625 
(1958), which holds that "satisfaction" contracts are not 
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illusory, and are enforceable. 
.An objective standard should be applied in this case, 
and the contract should be construed as requiring Ogden City 
to permit removal of such quantity of road materials as is 
reasonable under the circumstances, considering the needs of 
the contractor, the topography of the area, the condition of 
the property, the quantities of materials available, and the 
potential and prospective uses of the property after removal 
of the material. 
But even if the contract, at the time of its execution, 
was not sufficiently certain to be enforced, it thereafter 
became so, and as said in Restatement of Contracts, §32, 
comment c: 
Offers which are originally too indefinite 
may later acquire precision and become valid 
offers, by the subsequent words or acts of the 
offeror or his assent to words or acts of the 
offeree. 
See also, Moon Motor Car Co. of New York v. Moon Motor 
Car Co., Inc., 29 F.2d 3, 4 (1928), in which it is pointed 
out by Justice Learned Hand, that the contract is enforce-
able if, "when the time arrives," there is some standard by 
which it can be tested. 
The evidence is undisputed that prior to the time 
Gibbons and Reed Company submitted the highway bid, its 
project engineer went to the office of the City Engineer to 
determine the available quantity of material. Mr. Gibbons 
- i ^ 
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testified that the Assistant City Engineer produced maps of 
the area and pointed out the lines and grades at 31st Street 
and the ramp road to Interstate 15. On this basis, Gibbons 
and Reed Company went to the property and made surveys of 
the quantity of material which could be produced. The first 
survey showed that approximately 628,000 tons could be 
obtained, and a second, more professional, survey showed 
that with a 2% grade more than 1,000,000 cubic yards could 
be obtained. 
Without regard to the authority of the Assistant City 
Engineer to agree as to the amount of the material to be | 
removed, it is clear that the city is charged with knowledge • 
of the quantity expected to be removed by Gibbons and Reed 
Company. It was the duty of the Assistant City Engineer to 
report such matters to the Director of Public Works, and his 
to report to and consult with the City Council and the City 
Manager. Moreover, the Assistant City Engineer did in fact 
report to the Director of Public Works that he had met with 
Mr. Gibbons concerning the removal of the material. 
Under these circumstances, the knowledge of the Assis-
tant City Engineer was the knowledge of the city. The 
general rule, as found in Restatement of Agency, Second, 
•e »<* follows: §272, is as xu 
rules 
follows.
 t o t h e 
Kssz^^su3uability 
T £ -
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of a principal is affected by the knowledge 
of an agent concerning a matter as to which 
'he acts within his power to bind the princi-
pal or upon which it is his duty to give the 
principal information. 
Comment c. Situations in which knowledge 
is important. In contracts, knowledge of a 
contracting party is relevant in determining 
the interpretation of the contract, in the de-
termination of grounds for reformation or res-
cission, and in determing the questions relat-
ing to performance and breach. Thus, if one 
party knows that the other party is giving a 
particular interpretation to the words of an 
offer, this interpretation, unless prevented 
by the parole evidence rule, prevails. * * * 
Inasmuch as Ogden City knew of the interpretation being 
placed upon the contract by Gibbons and Reed Company, any 
uncertainty was eliminated, and the city had an obligation 
to furnish the material needed by Gibbons and Reed Company, 
up to 628,000 cubic yards. 
Ogden City was obligated to furnish the material whether 
or not there was any "consideration", e.g., a promise to 
take a particular amount of material. The doctrine of 
promissory estoppel applies, inasmuch as Ogden City knew of 
Gibbons and Reed's plans before the company submitted its 
bid to the Road Commission, and Gibbons and Reed relied, to 
its detriment, on the enforceability of the option. See 
Restatement of Contracts, §90: 
A promise which the promisor should 
reasonably expect to induce action or for-
bearance of a definite and substantial 
character on the part of the promisee and 
which does induce such action or forbear-
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ance is binding if injustice can be avoid-
ed only by enforcement of the promise. 
II 
OGDEN CITY IS ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING THAT THE OPTION 
AGREEMENT WAS TOO VAGUE. 
The authorities set out above relating to knowledge of 
the city, reliance by Gibbons and Reed Company, and action 
by Gibbons and Reed Company to its detriment, are also suffi-
cient to estop Ogden from claiming that the option agreement 
was too vague to be enforceable. Because of its reliance on 
the designated lines and grades, Gibbons and Reed Company 
was damaged in the amount of $41,596.00, and the city 
should not now be heard to say that the contract was too 
vague. See Migliaccio v. Davis, 120 Utah 1, 232 P.2d 195 
(1951) . 
The statute of frauds being an affirmative defense, 
Rule 8(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, appellant will 
reserve argument on that point for its reply brief, if the 
point is raised by respondents. 
Ill 
OGDEN CITY BREACHED THE OPTION AGREEMENT. 
The trial court found that even if the option agreement 
was valid, there was no breach because Gibbons and Reed had 
not exercised the option, and therefore "said option never 
became an effective contract for the sale and purchase of 
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any road building material" (R.513). 
But under the circumstances, the company was not re-
quired to exercise the option. In early May, 1966, the 
company received information to the effect that Ogden City 
had sold the land to Hardy Scales Company; as a result, 
Richard F. Reed met with the Ogden council, the City Manager, 
and members of the Road Commission. The outcome of that 
meeting was that the city stood firm in its resolve to sell 
the property; and 3 days later, on May 20, it executed a 
warranty deed conveying to defendants Robin or Hardy Scales 
Co*. This was a repudiation of the option agreement and 
excused Gibbons and Reed from the formality of exercising 
it. 
A positive statement that the promisor will not or 
cannot substantially perform his promise, or the transfer-
ring or contracting to transfer to a third person an in-
terest in specific land, goods, or in other things essential 
for the substantial performance of a contractual duty, con-
stitutes a repudiation of the contract. Restatement of 
Contracts, §318. 
And where an optionor repudiates the option prior to 
the time of its exercise, it is held that an action for 
damages will lie without a subsequent attempt to exercise 
the option. 
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In Fullington v. M. Penn Phillips Co., 7 38 Ore. 321, 
395 P.2d 124 (1964), the trial court had granted summary 
judgment in favor of an optionor on the ground, in part, 
that "an original action for damages in such a case when the 
option has not been exercised cannot be brought," suggest-
ing that the option had to be "exercised" notwithstanding 
repudiation, and that damages could be recovered only if the 
optionor thereafter refused to perform the contract. The 
Supreme Court of Oregon reversed and held that accepted 
principles of contract law "compel us to recognize the right 
of the option holder to recover damages upon breach of the 
option contract." 
In McFerran v.. Heroux, 44 Wash.2d 631, 269 P.2d 815 
(1954), an action was brought for a breach of an option 
agreement, where it had been repudiated, but not exercised* 
The court said: 
It has been suggested that this action 
was brought prematurely because, until the 
optionee exercises his option, he has no 
present right in the grandstand which is the 
subject matter of the option. It is true 
that the plaintiff does not presently have 
a contract of purchase. But to infer that, 
until an option has been exercised, the op-
tionee has no rights of any kind capable of 
being enforced, is to ignore the contractual 
nature of the option itself. 
See also authorities cited therein, 1 Corbin on Contrac 
§272, p. 909, James on Option Contracts, §1104, p. 504; also 
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Thompson v. Whitney, 20 Utah 1, 57 Pac. 429 (1899), to 
the effect that demand and refusal are not necessary where 
a promisor has repudiated the contract. 
IV 
IF THE OPTION AGREEMENT WAS NOT ENFORCEABLE, THE UTAH 
STATE ROAD COMMISSION BREACHED ITS CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT 
WITH GIBBONS AND REED COMPANY. 
There was testimony from Ogden's Director of Public Works 
that it was his oral understanding with the representatives 
of the Road Commission, at the time the option agreement was 
negotiated and signed, that Ogden City was not obligated to 
furnish any material, but that the agreement was for the 
purpose of fixing the price in the event Ogden City did 
elect to furnish material. There was also testimony from 
Mr. Schrader and Mr. Griffin to the effect that during the 
negotiations the city stated that the material could be 
removed to an average depth of only six feet. 
If it is determined that an oral agreement between the 
commission and the city had the effect of limiting the 
liability of the city to a degree not indicated by the 
option agreement, the commission is liable to Gibbons and 
Reed Company for its contractual representations respecting 
quantities of material available, and for its failure to 
disclose the specific limitations required by the city with 
respect to the excavation. 
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In construction contracts an owner has a duty to dis-
close to contractors such pertinent information as is avail-
able to it. 
In Kiely Construction Co. v. State, 154 Mont. 363, 
463 P.2d 888 (1970), a contractor based his claim for re-
covery upon the fact that a report by the state indicated 
that 30-foot deep test holes had been drilled in a quarry, 
when they had not, and that the material encountered was 
different than that indicated in the contract. 
The court noted that it was the practice of Montana 
State Highway Department to provide bidders with reports on 
the availability of surfacing material for the purpose of 
assisting the contractor in preparing his bid and obtaining 
a lower bid. The court held that the contractor was en-
titled to rely upon the information given to it by the 
state. The court reached a similar decision in Haggart 
Construction Co. v. State, 149 Mont. 422, 427 P.2d 686 
(1967), holding the state responsible for the incorrect in-
formation given to the contractor, notwithstanding general 
exculpatory provisions. See also Helene Curtis Industries, 
Inc., v. U.S., 312 F.2d 774 (Ct.Cl. 1963); Hardeman-Monier-
Hutcherson v. U.S. , 458 F.2d 1364 (Ct.Cl. 1972); Foster 
Construction C.A. and Williams Brothers Company v. U.S., 
435 F.2d 873, 880 (Ct.Cl. 1970); Morrison Knudsen Company, 
Inc. v. U.S., 397 F.2d 826 (Ct.Cl. 1968). 
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In the present case the commission had information not 
available to Gibbons and Reed: that the city intended to 
limit excavation to an average depth of 6 feet; and that it 
did not intend to be bound by an option agreement to furnish 
material, but was only willing to attempt to arrive at an 
agreement with a successful contractor. This information 
should have been disclosed in the contract documents, for it 
would have made a great deal of difference to the contrac-
tors in the computations of their bids. Mr. Griffin testi-
fied that the purpose of obtaining the option was to deter-
mine the availability of the material and to fix a price - a 
factor important to the commission since the prices at which 
materials are available would have a direct bearing upon the 
total price the commission was required to pay for the 
project. 
Not only did the commission fail to disclose the ne-
gotiations between the city and the commission, it made 
positive representations in the plans. Sheet 3-A indicates 
that approximately 1,900,000 yards of material would be 
available from the railroad and city properties, of which 
more than 600,000 yards would have to come from the city 
property, inasmuch as the railroad property was capable of 
producing only 1,200,000 yards. 
An additional factor bearing upon the liability of the 
commission in this regard is its practice to include in 
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option agreements any special limitations or burdens with • 
respect to the obtaining of material. This is borne out by 
1 
the testimony of the two commission representatives, and by • 
the provisions contained in the other option agreements • 
introduced in evidence, Exhibits P and Q. 
1 
DEFENDANTS ROBIN AND HARDY SCALES COMPANY TORTIOUSLY 
INTERFERED WITH THE OPTION AGREEMENT BETWEEN GIBBONS AND ' 
REED COMPANY AND OGDEN CITY. 1 
Mr. Robins testified that he knew of the Gibbons and 
Reed option agreement when he entered into the agreement 
with the city. Notwithstanding this knowledge, and reason 
to know the specific terms of it, the parties contracted 
with the city for the purchase of the property. See 86 
C.J.S., Torts, §§43 and 44; and 45 Am.Jur.2d, Interference, 
§§41 and 50. 
In addition, Robins or Hardy took the property subject 
to an equitable servitude, since they had knowledge of the 
option. See 20 Am.Jur.2d, Covenants, Conditions, and 
Restrictions, §305. Although it is not clear who entered 
into the contract with the city and took the conveyance, 
Robin is the sole owner of all of the stock in Hardy Scales 
Company and the purchase was being made for the purposes of 
both. The only representative Robin or Hardy had in the 
state of Utah was Clay Barnard III, who told Gibbons and 
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Reed Company that they would not be able to remove any 
material from the property. This is sufficient to bind Mr. 
Robin and the company. 
VI 
GIBBONS AND REED COMPANY SUFFERED SUBSTANTIAL DAMAGES. 
Because of the necessity of Gibbons and Reed Company 
obtaining fill material from another source, it incurred 
increased costs for hauling, placing, excavation, stripping, 
and rehabilitation of the property from which the material 
was taken. The amount of such damages were computed care-
fully from general production costs of Gibbons and Reed 
Company and expert projections. They totaled $41,596.00. 
VII 
THE COURT FAILED TO MAKE FINDINGS OF FACT ON ALL OF THE 
MATERIAL ISSUES IN THE CASE, AND THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
ARE INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT. 
There were a number of issues in this case which the 
court simply did not touch upon in making and entering its 
findings of fact. There was no finding as to knowledge of 
the city respecting the reliance of Gibbons and Reed Company 
on lines and grades established by the Assistant City Engi-
neer; the amount of damages; or repudiation of the option 
by the city. The conclusions reached are contrary to the 
law, and if this court does not direct entry of judgment for 
plaintiff, the district court should be directed to make 
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findings on the material issues raised by the pleadings and 
the pre-trial order. 
VIII 
THE MEMORANDUM OF COSTS FILED BY THE UTAH STATE ROAD 
COMMISSION WAS NOT TIMELY. 
In the court below Gibbons and Reed Company filed a 
motion to have the costs taxed by the court, but such motion 
was not ruled upon by the court prior to transmittal of the 
record to this court. Inasmuch as the costs to be awarded 
"shall abide the final determination of the cause," Rule 
54(d) (1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, it is not necessary 
for the court to determine the costs at this time, but 
appellant is not abandoning its right to challenge the costs 
claimed by the respondents. 
CONCLUSION 
Ogden City, with full knowledge that the Road Commis-
sion was obtaining options for road building materials in ordc 
to establish prices at which materials would be available, 
executed an option agreement by which it agreed to sell road 
building materials for three cents per cubic yard. Under 
this agreement, Ogden City had an obligation to permit 
Gibbons and Reed Company, the successful bidder, to remove 
such material as was reasonable under the circumstances. 
If the option agreement was initially too vague to be 
enforceable, it became enforceable when Gibbons and Reed 
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Company went to Ogden City to determine the lines and grades 
to which material might be removed. The Assistant City 
Engineer, who had a duty to report to the Director of Public 
Works, and who in turn had a duty to report to his superiors, 
knew what Gibbons and Reed Company was planning and that 
knowledge is the knowledge of the city. 
All of this occurred prior to the time Gibbons and Reed 
Company submitted its bid to the Road Commission in reliance 
upon the option agreement and the lines and grades estab-
lished. If the contract was uncertain to begin with, it 
became certain then, and Ogden City became obligated to 
furnish the 498,000 cubic yards Gibbons and Reed Company had 
to find elsewhere. 
It was not necessary to "exercise" the option inasmuch 
as it had been repudiated; and this action is for the dama-
ges resulting from breach of the option agreement. 
Defendants Robin and Hardy Scales Company had obliga-
tions under the contract, and they also had an obligation 
not to interfere with Gibbons and Reed's contract with Ogden 
City, or even with its reasonable expectation of obtaining 
material. The covenant and agreement between those parties 
and Ogden City refers to the option and the purchasers had 
an obligation to know the terms of that agreement and the 
rights claimed under it. 
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If neither Ogden City nor Robin and Hardy Scales Com-
pany is liable under the agreement, the Utah State Road 
Commission is. It gave the contractor definitive informa-
tion as to the amount of materials that might be expected, 
and failed to disclose to it other information it had as to 
the expectations of Ogden City and the possible limitations 
on the depth to which materials might be removed. 
As a result, Gibbons and Reed Company suffered sub-
stantial damages. 
The findings and conclusions of the law entered by the 
trial court are contrary to the evidence and against law and 
the judgment should be reversed with directions to enter 
judgment for appellant, or to make additional findings, or 
to grant a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Bryce E. Roe 
ROE AND FOWLER 
340 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
i 
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